how we ensure there are no democracies in Africa, French, US & UK style

Quentin Peel: Flaws in Africa's jewels
By Quentin Peel
Published: December 3 2002 19:39 | Last Updated: December 3 2002 19:39


The car bomb that killed nine Kenyan dancers and three Israeli tourists in Mombasa last week was a grim reminder of how impossible it may be to "win" the war against terrorism. It was also a bitter blow for Kenya, once regarded as a haven of stability and security in east Africa.


The blast happened just one month before the most important and divisive presidential poll in that country's 39 years of independence. It could be used as an excuse to undermine a fair election. It will probably devastate the tourist industry in a country that has suffered almost a decade of economic decline. It could scarcely have come at a worse moment.

Even if it can be proved that the terrorists were foreign-based, the attack is likely to focus attention both on Kenya's soaring crime rate and its pervasive corruption, including in the police force. A country that was once regarded as one of Africa's rare economic success stories, and a model for all the other former British colonies, is now in danger of being labelled another African basket case.

On the opposite side of the continent, another erstwhile "model" is in an even more desperate state: Ivory Coast, once the prize pupil of French colonialism, is threatened by civil war and anarchy. Two rebel movements are fighting government forces, the latter held together with the help of foreign mercenaries, while 1,200 French troops are failing to enforce a ceasefire.

So what has gone wrong with the two countries that less than 30 years ago were held up in London and Paris as the examples that others should emulate? What lessons can be learnt for Africa's plight today?

Both governments pursued quite different paths in the wake of independence. In the Ivory Coast, President Félix Houphouet-Boigny opted for the closest possible ties to Paris. Those were underpinned by a secret defence pact, guaranteeing French military intervention in the case of external threat. Many of the commanding heights of the economy remained in French hands. It was a recipe for a steady inflow of foreign investment and a thriving economy.

The downside was that Mr Houphouet-Boigny became a benevolent dictator and failed to establish any of the essential institutions of a democratic state. He cleverly kept his army weak and distributed enough of the spoils of economic growth to keep the country docile and united. But when he died in 1993, he left a political vacuum.

Kenya was altogether more self-reliant and less neo-colonial. After independence in 1963, Kenyans moved relatively swiftly into managerial positions in both government and the private sector. The colonial power was kept at arm's length, although foreign investment was welcomed.

But there were important similarities. First Jomo Kenyatta, the founding father of Kenyan independence, and then his successor Daniel arap Moi, tolerated no serious challenge to their position as president. Second Kenya, was a loyal pro-western ally in the cold war contest in Africa. It had, and still has, defence pacts with the UK and US. Like Ivory Coast, it was a favoured destination for aid from Europe, the US and the international institutions.

The real problem, however, was that in both countries a blind eye was turned by donors to the signs of growing corruption and economic mismanagement, precisely because they were good cold war allies. The distribution of favours in property and contracts became widespread. But the international community did little to discourage it, in the interests of preserving political stability.

Of course, there were genuine and frequently intractable economic and political problems. Kenya faced a soaring birth rate and erratic commodity prices, as well as tough climatic conditions. Ivory Coast, which put much of its faith in cocoa production, has seen the cocoa price slump in the 1990s, compounded by overproduction throughout west Africa.

Both countries also have unstable ethnic balances to preserve: in Ivory Coast between the Muslim north and Christian south, and in Kenya between the dominant Kikuyu tribes and minority groups. But corruption and ethnic favouritism have undermined stable economic and political management, and frightened off foreign investors.

Ivory Coast, with civil war under way, is in a far worse state than Kenya. Indeed, Kenya's elections on December 27 provide a real chance for change, through the ballot box. If Mwai Kibaki, the former vice-president, defeats Uhuru Kenyatta, son of the founding father, it will be a good day for democracy.

The danger, however, is that the old cold war preferences will be replaced by a new favouritism, based on the US-led war on terrorism. Washington's priorities will rule. Those who are seen as "good allies" in this war will be preferred, and a blind eye will be turned once again to bad governance, if the perpetrators are loyal. Let us hope the sorry lessons of Kenya and Ivory Coast are not forgotten.

This column appears on Wednesdays

quentin.peel@ft.com