* quite, completely agree - although this level of differentiation ought to credit barthes to some degree as well, especially if considering the following: it seems that barthes is using saussure's distinction between parole (speech, ie. the live language) and langue (being the syntactic and grammatical system re: speech and writing):

"A language is therefore, so to speak, language minus speech: it is at the same time a social institution and a system of values. As a social institution, it is by no means an act, and it is not subject to any premeditation. It is the social part of language, the individual cannot by himself either create or modify it; it is essentially a collective contract which one must accept in its entirety if one wishes to communicate."

it's langue then, which is being designated as fascist here. i got the impression that this is about the creation of linguistic conventions and meaning, which can be rather oppressive without hermeneutic reflection: our conventions imply the rules that govern the system that gives us meaning. cf. nietzsche's universal perspectivism ("there are no facts, only interpretations" - "hermeneuin", v - to interpret).

gadamer: "In language there is, first of all, both langue and parole, to use Saussure's distinction. The spoken word (parole) is something other than the system of symbols (langue) that constitute language. . . . Speech exists in texts. Yes, certainly, but the texts are alien or brutal. How is this speech, the speaking word, really preserved in the written text? Is it completely the utterance of my mind? Are we not all acquainted with the alienation between what we said and what we had in mind? . . . We must always look for the real meaning of an utterance."

it seems that the epistemic fallacy of positive acceptance is something that happens via langue, as in, the creation of meaning in language is a positive step. not to say that "language is fascist", but that an unreflective application thereof will most certainly lead to "mental slavery", especially in a world where an individualist and profane hermeneutic is non-existent. it seems to be in the systematic nature of langue where barthes sees a certain degree of totalitarian coercion to this end, not in the content or the act of communication itself - i don't think then that he actually denies the possibility of liberated expression per se. but anyway, can't make much of "forced to speak" notion either. other than that it seems to point at the positivist elements in habermas' communicative ethics - which i always dig.

link re: ricoeur's liberation hermeneutics sexy. is a bit like marcuse's "since we're unfree...". at most, i see barthes as doing a semantic marcuse.

* hyperpleased with democray now link! the haiti situation appears to be extremely hard to interpret properly. john reeves' article this month was especially telling to this end. reading between the lines has never been harder. hope nc is worming over this.