20.4.03

re: earlier, more radical Habermas (yes, am currently a bit dismayed by his later work... more on this in the future) and Positivismusstreit - I know I seem to be obsessed with this topic these days, however, it does shed light on an interesting relationship between politics and knowledge (ie. everything).

In 'Knowledge and Interest' (as in a recent post last month), Habermas notes that, historically, "positivism unreflectively skips over the epistemic dimension of inquiry, thus has fallen behind the level of reflection as designated by Kant". What does this mean technically?

Historically it may be so that positivism couldn't have been possible without Kant, however, is it not so that Kant's reflective essence allowing for the Copernican analogy of heliocentricity is missed in positive philosophy? Does positivism's dogmatic belief-in-itself and consequent inability for epistemic self-reflection make it geocentric? Does its barring of the synthetic potential of the reflective subject make it unenlightened? Does positivist methodology require the Kantian contribution to epistemology at all?

Am lazy - anyone in Kant mode at the moment?

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