5.4.03

Habermas - From the introduction to 'Erkenntnis und Interesse' (sorry about the rash translations):

"Any contemporary discourse concerned with the conditions of possible knowledge must [...] begin with what has been achieved by modern analytical means. To return to the unmediated dimension of epistemic research is not possible - this dimension being what positivism ignores and "transcends" unreflectively. Positivism as a whole has thus fallen behind the level of Kantian reflection. [love this, ie. positivism = in a sense geocentric in Copernico-Kantian terms, hehe, bourgois nonse-toss, cf. Stahl: "shit!" - or when lawyers pull the strings unreflectively? cf. Nazi Germany and US, although Bush 43 comes from the business side of things - a next step towards this sort of incipiency?]

...

Hegel's critique of Kant showed the phenomenological self-reflection of knowledge to be the necessary component in the radical critique of knowledge ('notwendige Radikalisierung der Erkenntniskritik'); but, whilst preoccupied with premises of personal identity, he came short of completing the programme in a consequent manner. Marx, whose historical materialism challenged the dynamic of Hegelian self-reflection, misunderstood his own concept and thus completed the de(con)struction of epistemology [like industrial revolution -> techno/bureaucracy]. This is how positivism could ignore the link between scientific methodology and the objective attainment of knowledge and construct the absolutism of pure methodology on the basis of ignorance and repression."



then, shedding more light on above, Chapter II: 'Positivismus, Pragmatismus, Historismus', this is exactly how it happened:

"Positivism represents the end of epistemology. A theory of the sciences takes its place.

...

The existence of the modern sciences [has rendered] useless the transcendental inquiry into the conditions of possible knowledge. Knowledge is implicitly defined via the results of scientific inquiry. Therefore, the transcendental question of the possibilities/conditions of knowledge can only be usefully posed in the form of a methodological examination of the "rules" of construction and verification of scientific theories.

...

Positivism, however, by dogmatizing its belief in science in itself, fulfils a prohibitive function thus "protecting" research from any epistemic self-reflection.

...

It doesn't suffice to 'do' methodology; it needs to cover the epistemic requirements, or better even: methodology must maintain itself as the legitimate and trusted heir of the epistemic tradition. Positivism rises and falls with the basic tenet of 'scientism', namely that the meaning of knowledge is defined by scientific praxis and therefore can be sufficiently explained via the analysis of scientific method. Epistemology, which per se transcends the frame of methodology, falls victim to the same verdict of pointlessness that was once spoken over the existence of metaphysical enquiry.

...

The fall of epistemology and the consequent rise of scientific theory is most clearly shown in that the reflective subject no longer represents the frame of reference [i.e. a world full of operators and anti-intellectualism - SHORTCUTS TO THINKING (nod to the big man.. ;-)]."


and yes, it is has to do with all those pics on the header of this page - the fact that this isn't inherently clear is indicative of certain 'issues' in this society.

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